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1.0 Introduction 
 
Ever since the Financial Crisis in 2008 followed by a collapse of both the US and 
European markets, cash holdings have adduced ample attention so much so that 
directors of firms worldwide cannot afford to leave it as an inattentionable issue. 
Companies, no matter in US, UK or China, are redirecting their financial plans of 
cash holdings and adjusting their balance sheets in view of any possible economic 
downfall in the near future, thereby creating a shield made of cash for their companies 
to cope with any urgent financing needs, or any unexpectedly high extra charges from 
financial institutions upon crucial moments.  
 
It is therefore an interesting topic to dig out the deep&down basis behind the cash 
holdings decisions in firms and to select all the determinants that affect the decision 
making power of firms. My dissertation would first spare a portion of which to briefly 
explain the rationale of holding cash in firms, which is followed by a study of 3 sets 
of dominant cash holdings theories identifying the determinants that influence cash 
holdings decisions in firms. I would then further expand the scope of determinants to 
country specific factors that matter among firms in US, UK and those in China. After 
the literature review, the methodology of both data collection and hypothesis of this 
dissertation would be discussed and the model of regression and the statistical results 
would be listed out. I would therefore, according to my topic, have a cross&sectional 
data analysis as well as a comparison among US, UK and China market firms, 
intending to draw a conclusion for what marks a difference for the cash holdings 
decisions among the 3 countries’ firms.  
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2.0 Rationale of Cash Holdings Decisions in Firms 
 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) dissects cash holdings literature and 
classifies the decision making power of firms into four rationales described as 
follows. 
 
2.1 Transaction Rationale 
 
Transaction costs incurs upon swapping and converting of illiquidable assets to cash. 
Firms thereby intend to hold sufficient cash so as to deal with financially restrained 
situations to minimize transaction procedures and save transaction costs (Milligan 
(1997)). 
 
2.2 Precaution Rationale 
 
Precaution is better than cure is not a cliché and a safety reserve is necessary for firms 
to lessen financial distress in view of any fluctuation of cash flow and any capital 
raising restrains, so that firms would not let go prosperous investment opportunities 
(Han and Qui (2007)).  
 
2.3 Taxation Rationale 
 
The foreign exchange rate mechanism dictates the cash holdings decisions in firms to 
manage different tax systems worldwide. Firms rather retain their earnings from a 
specific region with currencies to pay tax than exchanging twice for taxation purpose 
(Foney, Hartsell, Titmen and Twit (2007)).  
 
2.4 Agency Rationale  
 
Directors are agents of firms controlling and reserving the decision making powers 
among themselves. Separation of management and ownership thereby creates a risk of 
agency problem and directors tend to hold cash to retain control (Ditmar, Marht Smith 
and Servas (2003)).  
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3.0 Theories of Cash Holdings Decisions in Firms 
 
3 sets of cash holdings theories have been developed to analyze and identify 
determinants that make and alter cash holdings decisions in firms. 
 
3.1 Trade Off Theory 
 
Trade off theory balances the costs and benefits of cash holdings and assumes that a 
firm could identify their optimum standards of cash holdings by measuring the 
marginal costs and the marginal benefits.  
 
The marginal cost of holding too many cash is the opportunity cost of capital 
investment; while the marginal benefits of cash holdings includes the reduction of the 
risk of financial misery upon crisis and the minimization of costs of raising funds 
externally or liquidating assets in existence.  
 
The following characteristics are relevant to firm’s cash holdings decision from the 
trade off theory. 
 
3.1.1 Payment of Dividend 
 
The theory suggests a negative relationship between the payment of dividend and the 
cash holding decision as firms which pay dividend to shareholders periodically tend 
to reserve less cash.  
 
3.1.2 Opportunity for Investment  
 
There appears to be a positive relationship between opportunity of investment 
opportunity and cash holdings as firms with greater opportunities for investment 
incline to hold more cash in view of the possible growth of revenue arising from those 
investments. The opportunity cost for losing such investment would be high.  
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3.1.3 Substitutes of Liquidable Assets 
 
Negative relationship is expected between the substitutes of liquidable assets and cash 
holdings as firms suffer less from converting the liquidable assets into cash when 
compared with the illiquidable ones.  
 
3.1.4 Leverage 
 
The theory predicts that an abstruse relationship can be found between leverage and 
cash holdings as, on the one hand, if leverage is defined to increases the probability of 
bankruptcy, firms with higher leverage would keep more cash; on the other hand, 
however, this is the measure of the firms’ ability to issue debt, firms with developed 
capital market would hold less cash.  
 
3.1.5 Firm Size 
 
Negative relationship between firm size and cash holdings is expected to be seen. 
According to the economies of scale in cash management, larger firms would hold 
less cash than smaller firms. Beside, larger firms would obtain a better discount in 
raising funds externally form financial institutions and therefore larger firms would 
again hold less cash owing to its bargaining power to arrange capital borrowing with a 
less expensive fee. In addition, it is expected that larger firms would face less 
financial difficulties and its cash reserve ratio to assets is therefore smaller.  
 
3.1.6 Cash Flow 
 
The theory concludes a negative relationship between cash flow and cash holdings as 
cash flow with liquidity offers a likely substitute for cash holdings. 
 
3.1.7 Uncertainty of Cash Flow  
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Distinct to the determinant of cash flow, a positive relationship can be seen between 
cash flow uncertainty and cash holdings. The volatility of cash flow, to the contrary, 
suggests a high chance of cash shortage and a great fluctuation. Firms tend to hold 
more cash in order to avoid any undesirable consequences of lack of cash. 
 
3.1.8 Debt Maturity 
 
Again, an ambiguous relationship can be observed between debt maturity and cash 
holdings. To one extent, debt maturity may be negatively linked to cash holdings as 
short&term debt are subject to a sudden risk of financial distress depending on the 
credit terms and general environments; while to the other extent, it is generally 
accepted that only firms with the best and the worst credit risk would issue short&term 
debt while firms with credit risk in&between would issue long&term debt. For firms 
with the highest credit rating it is expected that these firms well hold less cash, and 
therefore debt maturity may be positively linked to cash holdings.  
 
3.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking Order Theory constructs an order for firms to fund and finance investments, 
which is called a pecking order: first deal with retained earnings, and then with debts, 
finally with equity. The purpose of this Pecking Order is to minimize asymmetric 
information costs and to treat cash as an intermediate between retained earnings and 
investments.  
 
3.2.1 Opportunity for Investment 
 
A positive relationship between opportunity for investment and cash holdings are 
expected. Greater investment opportunity generates greater demand for cash, because 
cash deficit entails an engagement of pricey exterior financing but for a giving up of 
profitable investment opportunities.  
 
3.2.2 Leverage  
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It is recommended that the adverse relationship between leverage and cash holdings 
can result, as debt; typically grows when investment surpasses retained earnings and 
dropped when investment is below retained earnings. Consequently, cash holdings 
follows negative pattern, i.e. cash holdings fall when firms are overinvested and grow 
when they are underinvested.    
 
3.2.3 Firm Size 
 
A positive relationship is expected between firm size and cash holdings. Larger firms 
are seemingly to be more successful and thus hold more cash.  
 
3.2.4 Cash flow 
 
A positive relationship can be developed as it is expected that firms with higher cash 
flow will have more cash. 
 
3.3 Free Cash Flow Theory 
 
Looking the cash holdings decisions from the managers of firms’ angle, they would 
have an incentive to build up cash so as to create control over firms’ major decisions 
and to retain discretionary power over cash distribution arrangements. This also 
relates to the confidentiality of firms’ investments projects. As raising external funds 
necessarily leads to a disclosure and therefore exposure of the investment projects 
undergoing by firms, managers tend to hold sufficient cash to reduce the need for 
disclosure and thereby keeping their master plans in their heads. Abundant amount of 
cash holdings also reduce the burden upon managers to think twice before 
implementing investment projects.  
 
3.3.1 Opportunity for Investment  
 
It is predicted that the relationship between opportunity for investment and cash 
holdings would well be inverse. Firms with poorer investment opportunities would 
hold more cash to ensure the availability of funds for managers to invest.  
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3.3.2 Leverage 
 
Negative relationship is again to be found between leverage and cash holdings. Lower 
leverage firms are less subject to monitoring and thereby allowing for managerial 
discretions to be made without considering shareholders’ interests. Thus, they would  
hold more cash for decision making. 
 
3.3.3 Firm Size 
 
Finally, a positive relationship is to be seen among firm size and cash holdings. 
Larger firms tend to have greater shareholder concentration, which provides rise to 
superior managerial discretion. Furthermore, as larger firms are not likely to be the 
target of a takeover due to the significant amount of financial resources required. 
Thus, it is predictable that managers of large firms have more control over firms’ 
investment and financial policies, leading to a greater amount of cash holdings. 
 
A table summarizing the 3 sets of theories is drawn below to mark a comparison of 
different determinants that affect cash holdings in firms.
	




		

 Trade-off Theory Pecking Order Theory Free Cash Flow Theory  
Dividend payments (DPO) Negative   
Investment opportunity 
set(Market to book ratio) 
Positive Positive Negative 
Liquid asset substitutes(NWC) Negative   
Leverage Negative Negative Negative 
Real Size Negative Positive Positive 
Cash flow Negative Positive  
Debt maturity Positive Positive  
R&D Positive   
 
However, the above three models cannot provide a concrete answer as to the variables 
which affects the decision making of the firms and therefore none of the above is a 
consensual matter among these models.  
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4.0 Country Specific Determinants 
 
Next, I would discuss country&specific characteristics, such as investor protection and 
legal environment, ownership structure and capital markets development that might 
determine the variation of cash levels across countries. 
 
4.1 Investor Protection and Legal Environment 
 
Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in countries with poor protection of shareholder 
rights hold twice as much cash as firms in countries with good protection of 
shareholder rights. They claim that the evidence is consistent with the view that 
investors in counties with poor shareholder protection are unable to force managers to 
pay out the excess cash. Therefore the legal environment of a country has a significant 
impact on firms (La Porta et al., 1998; and Demirguc&Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996 
and 2002). 
 
Moreover, La Porta et al(1998) study also illustrated that the legal environments could 
be a significant factor to the firms’ financial structure. Firms in common law 
countries are mostly Well protected by the extensive and complete legal framework, 
while firms in civil law countries with poor investor rights may be forced to use more 
internally generated funds, as external capital is likely to be expensive. 
 
In this case, countries like US whose under common law are expected to hold small 
amount of cash, while civil law countries like China are expected to hold more cash.   
 
4.2 Ownership Structure 
 
The ownership structure of a firm can also have an impact on their financial structure. 
Firms in Asia like China are mostly family businesses and rely strongly on internal 
investment, and so the total cash holdings are expected to be lower than countries 
with public companies such as US. 
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4.3 Capital Markets Development  
 
Prior studies suggested that firms in developed countries have better access to 
external finance and therefore tend to hold less cash. Their Capital Markets are more 
Well planned and mature. However, the impact of the Financial Crisis 2008 on 
corporate decision making power over cash holdings in US firms is influential and 
crucial. The Fed’s policy of reducing interest rates in responded to the emerging 
recession have sown the seeds for the disaster in 2008. It resulted in the failure of 
large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments and 
downturns in stock markets around the world. The government debt per GDP, as a 
measure of the countries' capability to make future payments on its debt, was last 
reported at 93.2 percent.  
 
Under the financial depression and market turndown in 2008, it was difficult for firms 
in US to raise finance through banks. Hence, factors such as the firms’ size and the 
liquidity condition are expected to be significant to cash holdings during the post&
crisis periods in US.  
 
The effect of the Financial Crisis in 2008 is, however, of minimal impact to the China 
market. Dittmar and Mahrt&Smith (2007) analyzed the US data and found out that the 
average cash holdings in US is around 13% of total assets, while Ramirex and Tadese 
(2009) detected that the average cash holdings in China is 18%. Such a big contrast 
may shed some lights as to why China can successfully escaped from the worldwide 
Financial Crisis in 2008 and at the same time maintaining an impressive economic 
growth rate of 8% in the same year. 
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5.0 Data Collection and Methodology 
 
5.1 Data Collection 
 
So as to investigate the determinants of cash holdings, a total of 6286 firms&year 
observations Ire obtained from Datastream for empirical testing from a selection of  
firms from US, UK and China for the period from 2000 to 2011. US and UK firms are 
representatives of the Well developed occident markets while China firms are used 
for the developing oriental markets. 
 
These data include survivors and non&survivors that performed on S&P Index, UK 
FTSE index and Shanghai Stock Exchange at any time in the sample period. In order 
to give a better picture of the actual impact of the determinants, firms from the 
financial and utility industries are precluded as they have different financial and 
accounting regulations and levels of deposits which may affect the capital structure.  
 
5.2 Hypothesis and Measures of Dependent Variables  
 
5.2.1 Cash Holdings 
 
Opler et al. (1999) defines cash holdings as the amount of cash and cash equivalents 
that a firm holds for a period of time. Cash holdings ratio is therefore the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets are computed as book value of 
assets less cash and equivalents. 
 
As firms in US, UK and China have different accounting standards, legal regulations, 
capital markets and institutional environments, it is not a surprise that the cash 
holdings ratio of the respective countries are distinct to one another. 
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5.3 Hypothesis and Measures of Independent Variables  
 
5.3.1 Payment of Dividend  
 
H1: It is predicted that the effect of dividend payments is negatively associated with 
the cash holdings policy.  
 
	
  



		
 
I would therefore use natural logarithm of total dividend payments as a proxy.  
Ln (  
5.3.2 Opportunity for Investment  
 
H2: There is a positive/negative association between market to book ratio and cash 
holdings. 
 
	
  
 or 
	
  



 
 
Thus I would employ the market&to&book ratio as a proxy for firm’s investment 
opportunity set.  
 

   !"
 # !"
 
 

 


 
 
5.3.3 Substitutes of Liquidable Assets  
 
H3: There is a negative association between net working capital ratio and cash 
holdings. 
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	
  

$%
&


 
 

The net working capital to assets ratio as a proxy for liquid asset substitutes as their 
assets can be seen as substitutes for cash holdings.  
 
$%
&

 
'())*+,-..*,./01,23'2.4
01,23-..*,./01,23'2.4
  
 
5.3.4 Leverage  
 
H4: There is first a negative .association between leverage and cash holdings.  
 
	
  
5
6*7*)28*
     
 
The effect of leverage on cash balances of firms is likely to be non&monotonic. To the 
extent that leverage of firms acts as a measure for their ability to issue debt one would 
expect a negative (substitution effect) relation between leverage and cash holdings.  
 
9 
9	: # 	:
9
:



;
 
 
5.3.5 Firm Size  
 
H5: There is a positive/negative association between firm size and cash holdings. 
 
	
  <
= or 
	
  

<
=
 
 
Small firms are found to hold more cash than their large counterparts because of the 
high costs of external funds. Large firms are considered to be more diversified than 
small firms and in turn less prone to bankruptcy related costs. (Al&Najjar & Belghitar 
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(2011)). Equally, it could be argue that large firms have less information asymmetry. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that if firm size is a proxy for information asymmetry, 
which reflects the external financing costs, then a negative relationship with cash 
holdings should be expected. So, I dispute that firm size is an important determinant 
of cash holdings and do not predict the sign of the association between firm size and 
cash holdings.  
 
5.3.6 Cash Flow  
 
H6: There is a negative association between cash flow and cash holdings. 
 
	
  

>?
 
 
Cash is an outcome of the financing and investment activities. I amount cash flow as 
earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation divided by book 
assets. Firms with advanced cash flow accumulate more cash because such firms 
might have enhanced investment opportunities. Thus, profitable firms are more able 
to pay dividends, pay their debt obligations and stockpile cash. Profitable firms will 
hold less cash and issue debt to finance their projects. Hence, there is a negative 
association between firm’s profitability and cash holdings.  
 
5.3.7 Debt Maturity  
 
H7: There is a positive association between debt maturity and cash holdings 
 
	
  :
 
 
It is measured as total debt less debt repayable in less than one year divided by total 
debt (Opler et al. 1999).  
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5.3.8 R&D to sales  
 
H8: There is a positive association between R&D to sales and cash holdings. 
 
	
  @ 
 
This variable measure growth opportunity. Firms with greater R&D are expected to 
have bigger costs of financial distress. R&D as a proxy for growth opportunities and 
financial distress could lead to a positive relation between cash holding and R&D 
spending. This is measured as R&D divided by sales, and set equal to zero when 
R&D is missing.  

5. 4 Methodology 

I study the determinants of cash holdings using a regression of cash holdings on the 
exogenous variables described above. Now I would introduce my methodology for 
this dissertation. 
 
First, I would run cross&sectional regressions for each year. Then, I would run a 
pooled time&series cross&sectional regression using all the available information.  
 
I also created 4 extra dummy variables and hypothesizes as shown below. 
 
5.4.1 Dividend Dummy  
 
H9: There is a negative association between dividend dummy and cash holdings. 
 
	
  



			
 
 
In order to test the effectiveness of dividend payment on cash holdings, I also 
construct a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm paid dividends in each year 
and set to zero if it did not.  
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Dummy variable =1 if firm paid dividends 
Dummy variable = 0 if firm did not pay dividends  
 
5.4.2 Industry Dummy 
 
H10: There is a positive association between industry dummy and cash holdings. 
 
	
  A		  
 
In addition, pervious studies shows that industry variation for cash holdings indicates 
that controlling for the industry effects is crucial. Thus, industry dummies are 
included to stand for industry specific factor that affect cash holdings and are not 
captured by the remaining variables in my model. Regarding to V.Subramaniam et al 
(2011) study, he suggests that chemicals and allied products sectors hold the most 
cash among all industries. In order to investigate the industry effect, I construct a 
dummy variable that set to one if the firms are from chemicals and allied products 
sector, and set to zero if other.  
 
Dummy variable = 1 if firms are from chemicals and allied products sector 
Dummy variable = 0 if firms are from non chemicals and non allied products sector 
 
5.4.3 Country Dummy 
 
H11: There is a positive association between country dummy and cash holdings 
 
	
  	  
 
As mentioned, firms in Asia like China are mostly family businesses and rely strongly 
on internal investment, and so the total cash holdings are expected to be lower than 
countries with public companies such as US and UK. Since China has a major 
different ownership structure than US and UK, especially in shareholders rights, there 
are significant differences in the average cash holdings across countries, thus I also 
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include country dummies that set to one if firms are from UK and US firms and zero 
if they are Chinese firms.  
 
Dummy variable = 1 if non&Chinese firms 
Dummy variable = 0 if Chinese firms 
 
5.4.4 Year Dummy 
 
H12: There is a positive association between year dummy and cash holdings. 
 
	
  B	  
 
To test the effect of financial crisis 2008 on cash holdings and control for any 
macroeconomic events, I have created a yearly dummy, which set to one if accounting 
period equal to the crisis period (2008&2011). 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if period between 2008&2011 
Dummy variable = 0 if other periods 2000&2007 
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6.0 Empirical Results  
 
6.1 Main Model  
 
Cash it = β0 + β1 Dividend Payout + β2 Market&to&Book ratio+ β3 Liquid asset 
substitutes + β4 Leverage + β5 Real size + β6 Cash flow to asset + β7Debt maturity + 
β8R&D  + εit 
 
Second, I investigate the country, industry effect in the cash holdings models. To 
control for any macroeconomic events I include the different dummies. 
 
Cash it = β0 + n∑ D it + εit 
 
Where Dit is a vector of dummy variables representing each specific dummy variable. 
I adopt the approach of Booth et. al (2001) who examine the capital structure decision 
across developing countries.  
 
Cash it = β0 + β1 Dividend Payout + β2  Market&to&Book ratio+ β3 Liquid asset 
substitutes + β4 Leverage + β5 Leverage
2
 + β6  Real size + β7 Cash flow to asset + 
β8Debt maturity  + n∑ D it + εit 
 
However, this model might suffer from endogeneity between the dependent variable 
and my exogenous variables, thus I would use Hausman test for the endogeneity.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2:(a) Description of exogenous variables; (b) whole sample
Country  
 


	
	

 

 




  !" #$ 	
%


&'(
#)
a)           
	 436  0.20538  14.90004  5.05513  0.42916  0.62083  21.30586  0.12715  0.96710  0.17439  
*+ 374  0.22227  5.46568  4.98402  0.31058  0.22575  9.11924  0.35425  0.96971  0.07005  
*, 335  0.38251  8.18266  1.43606  0.37978  0.48438  13.46951  0.35733  0.58465  0.02015  

 1145           

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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
b)      
		
 6286 0.2293365 0.4196259 0 7.055848 
 6286 7.643856 6.704604 &3.912023 21.04358 




 6286 4.633844 10.65886 0.0122357 368.8817 
  6286 0.3941513 0.7865196 0 33.58533 
!" 6286 0.34518  2.243335 &0.0528166 124.0223 
#$ 6286 17.39985 5.476154 5.370782 25.3838 
	%
 6286 0.2093237 0.7438154 0 47.03525 
&'( 6286 0.9250993 0.1610302 0.0537986 1 
#) 6286 0.1312289 1.288406 0 83.48332 
 
Note: Cash is cash ratio measured by cash to net asset ratio; Market&to&book ratio 
measured the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets; NWC 
measured the net working capital to assets ratio; Leverage measured as long&term debt 
plus debt in current liability, then divided by total assets; Real size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets; Cash flow to assets measured the earnings after 
interest, dividends, and taxes divided by book assets; Debt maturity measured as total 
debt repayable in less than one year divided by total debt; R&D measured as R&D 
expenses divided by sales, and set equal to zero if the value is missing. 
 
Table 2a & 2b show the breakdown of descriptive statistics of companies that 
included in my sample. From the dataset I have analyzed 1145 companies across the 
three sample countries, China (436), US (374) and the UK (335). The descriptive 
statistics reported the variables of firm years from the 2000&2011. 
 
Table 2 shows that firms in my sample hold significant level of cash, as it represents 
around 23% of the total assets. UK companies presenting values above the mean. UK 
has a cash holding ratio of 38%, it is much higher than other countries 21% in China, 
22% in US.  
 
On average, the market to book ratio is 4.63 across the three sample countries. China 
and US have relatively high market to book ratio compared to the UK. I used the net 
working capital to asset ratio (NWC) to measure the amount of liquid asset substitutes 
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in each firms. The two tables show NWC is between 30&40% across my main sample 
and the three sample countries.  
 
The leverage (debt divided by net assets) overall mean is 0.44365% with only one 
country below 30% (US) and three countries above 30% (China & UK).  
 
The average that the average size in my sample is 17.4, where Chinese firms tend to 
be larger in size.  
 
Cash flow to asset is a measure of firm’s profitability, the average cash flow is around 
20% of the total asset, I found that US and UK’s firms have higher cash flow to asset 
ratio compared to China (13%) 
 
Overall, companies in UK hold the highest amounts of cash, reply strongly on debt 
and pay low dividends. While firms in China and US hold relatively less in cash, rely 
partially on debt and pay high dividends.  

6.3 Correlation matrix 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix in which I notice that there are no high 
correlations between the variables across my sample of countries, in each country and 
the entire countries. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix Cash 
holding 
market to 
book ratio 
NWC Leverage Real size Cash 
Flow 
Debt 
Maturity 
R&D DPO 
-	          
		
 1         




 &0.0319 1        
  0.0054 0.0017 1       
!" &0.0402 0.0078 0.0389 1      
#$ 0.0358 &0.0139 &0.025 &0.2055 1     
	%
 &0.004 0.0095 &0.0102 0.4663 &0.2277 1    
&'( 0.1187 0.0109 0.1304 &0.0265 0.0044 0.0154 1   
#) &0.0148 &0.0008 &0.0117 &0.0015 0.0382 &0.0121 &0.0052 1  
 0.0367 &0.0108 0.0059 &0.0627 0.1538 &0.0476 &0.0293 &0.0164 1 
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.*+          
		
 1         




 0.0549 1        
  0.279 0.044 1       
!" &0.2419 0.1391 &0.13 1      
#$ &0.2506 &0.08 &0.3247 0.0168 1     
	%
 0.071 0.202 0.3463 &0.1678 &0.2129 1    
&'( 0.0138 &0.0015 0.0035 &0.1602 0.0134 &0.0336 1   
#) 0.4075 0.0115 0.0457 &0.2103 &0.1143 0.0306 &0.027 1  
 &0.2856 0.004 &0.1532 0.1628 0.641 0.0267 0.015 &0.2921 1 
*,          
		
 1         




 0.0108 1        
  &0.0645 &0.0126 1       
!" 0.5825 &0.2129 &0.0729 1      
#$ &0.2988 &0.0176 &0.0491 &0.3959 1     
	%
 0.5059 &0.1352 &0.0601 0.7093 &0.3643 1    
&'( &0.0231 &0.1232 0.1058 &0.1792 0.1594 0.0239 1   
#) &0.0226 &0.0287 &0.0083 &0.0288 0.0673 &0.0236 &0.0691 1  
 0.0922 &0.1514 &0.0294 0.2097 0.0583 0.2277 0.1208 &0.0753 1 
	
          
		
 1         




 &0.0109 1        
  &0.0323 0.0026 1       
!" 0.1354 &0.0089 &0.0145 1      
#$ &0.0775 0.0229 0.054 &0.0087 1     
	%
 0.1292 0.0107 &0.0272 0.481 &0.1885 1    
&'( &0.0832 0.0802 0.0693 &0.1468 0.1918 &0.0433 1   
#) &0.0042 0.0028 &0.0007 &0.0043 0.0465 &0.0183 0.0168 1  
 &0.0039 &0.0108 0.0132 &0.0071 0.3376 &0.0628 &0.0187 &0.0086 1 
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6.4 Univariate tests 
 
Table 4: Univariate tests
Variable %/' +

/'
	/' %
'	/'
		
 01002 00310 004103 0415
 6.11689  7.55442  8.14063  8.16990  




 4.26007  5.08189  4.73559  4.58320  
  0.42135  0.38536  0.39702  0.38559  
!" 0.61372  0.48898  0.56211  0.69157  
#$ 15.17860  17.43966  18.55046  17.84441  
	%
 0.20159  0.16662  0.18102  0.24368  
&'( 0.87791  0.93483  0.94603  0.93717  
#) 0.13626  0.15847  0.13369  0.12936  
 
Univariate tests present the means and medians of firm characteristics, all data sample 
are non&financial companies, publicly traded in China, US and UK.  
 
By splitting the cash holdings ratios into the four quartiles. I are able to observe how 
cash to assets ratio overlap across quartiles. Size and debt maturity show a positive 
relationship with cash holdings. By comparing between the first quartile and the forth 
quartile, it can be seen that firms size and debt maturity increased with cash holdings, 
this is predicted by the trade off and pecking order theories.  
 
Conversely, contradicted results are found for dividend payout (DPO), as findings 
shows firms with high cash holdings have larger dividend payout, which is 
inconsistent with the tradeoff theory prediction. Nevertheless, some firm&specific 
financial factors remain unchanged across cash&to&assets quartiles. Thus, the results 
are not sufficient to describe every part of connection between cash holdings and 
firm’s characteristics.  
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6.5 Regression Results 
6.5.1 Country specific analysis  
 
Table 5: Country 
specific analysis 
DPO Market to 
book ratio 
NWC Leverage Real size Cash Flow Debt Maturity R&D Observations Adj R&
Squard 
	 0.00579* &0.00102  0.07905** &0.40109*** 0.00403  0.01045  0.33507*** &0.00270  2433  0.1874  
1"' (0.00700) (0.11700) (0.00300) 0.00000  (0.41000) (0.60400) 0.00000  (0.60700)   
           
*+ &0.00126  0.00196** 0.79418*** &1.90387*** &0.0463488*** &0.23097*** &0.00594  1.283567*** 1564  0.2933  
1"' (0.79600) (0.02000) 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  (0.97300) 0.00000    
           
*, &0.01015  0.1133759*** &0.00966  0.2433274*** &0.01810  0.16339** 0.3584074*** 0.01720  701  0.38340  
1"' (0.12000) 0.00000  (0.38700) 0.00000  (0.40100) (0.00100) (0.00100) (0.78700)   

 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression model for each country; I used the cross&
sectional time series models to capture firm&specific characteristics. I discuss the 
results for each country below: 
 
6.5.1.1 China 
 
In related to China, evidence have found for the determinants of cash holdings. The 
result shows that there is a negative but insignificant relationship between market&to&
book ratio and cash holdings. This outcome denies the expected positive sign from 
pecking order theory. This might indicate that firms with better investment 
opportunity hold less cash.  
 
Consistent with my hypothesis with leverage H4, I report a negative relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings, significant at 1%. It is consistent with pecking 
order and free cash flow theories. This suggests that leverage can be vieId as a 
substitute for holding cash. For example, firms with greatest access external funds are 
less in need of cash to pay for investment, thus a negative relationship is expected 
between leverage and cash holdings.  
 
A positive sign between dividend payout and cash holdings is also found. This is 
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inconsistent with the trade off theory predication. This can be explain that less 
profitable firms tend to pay dividends to keep the reputation, but they are not able to 
obtain extra fund from external sources such as banks and hence hold cash for any 
contingencies to improve theory financial positions. In addition, my result is 
consistent with Al&Najjar (2012) study; he reported a significant and positive 
relationship between dividend payout and cash holding in China.  
 
A positive connection between debt maturity and cash holdings is identified; it is 
significant at 1% confidence level. This shows firms with fewer debt obligations due 
in next year hold more cash. The result is in line with H6, and thus supports the 
tradeoff theory and pecking order theory.  
 
Finally, there is no evidence of the impact of real size, cash flow ratio and R&D on 
cash holdings for China.  
 
6.5.1.2 US 
 
The US case shows that market to book ratio, net working capital, leverage, size, cash 
flow and R&D expenses determine cash holdings. In line with H2, the market to book 
ratio coefficient is significant at the 5% level, consistent with the trade off and 
pecking order theories predictions. The result suggests firms with a better investment 
opportunity set hold more cash.  
 
However, this evidence is contradicted with the free cash flow theory that states 
managers of firms with poor investment opportunities (low market to book ratios) will 
hold more cash to ensure the availability of funds to invest in positive NPV projects.  
 
The positive coefficient on the net working capital (NWC) to asset ratio is 
inconsistent with the trade off theory, which argues that liquid asset do not act as a 
cash substitutes in US. 
 
Consistent with my hypothesis with leverage H4, I again report a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings, significant at 1%, which suggests 
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that firms with better access to external funding hold less cash.  
 
Real Size, cash flow and R&D expenses are also significant at 1% in the pooled 
cross&sectional time&series regression, thus, the three variables are also the important 
determinants on cash holding in US.  
 
A negative relationship between size and cash flow on cash holdings is found; this 
suggests that large firms and profitable firms generally have low cash holdings, 
because they have better access to external funding and thus subject to less financial 
distress risks. The results are consistent with H5 and H6, which support the trade off 
theory.  
 
Finally, I reported a positive relationship between R&D expenses and cash holdings, 
it suggests that Firms with greater R&D are assumed to have greater costs of financial 
distress. Thus, there is a positive relation between cash holding and R&D spending. 
This is consistent with H8. 
 
6.5.1.3 UK 
 
Regarding to UK firms, the market to book ratio coefficient is significant at the 1% 
level, consistent with the H2. It suggests that 1% increase in the investment 
opportunity set (market to book ratio) would increase the cash holdings ratio by 
0.11%, ceteris paribus.  
Likewise, variable leverage is negatively related with cash holdings in the UK 
sample, significant at 1% level. On average, an increase in leverage by 1% would 
decrease the profitability ratio by 1.9%, ceteris paribus.  
 
Consistent with my hypothesis on debt maturity H6, I discover a positive connection 
between debt maturity and cash holdings; it is significant at 1% confidence level.  
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6.5.1.4 Summary 
 
The results of my controlled samples from the UK and the US show similar results, 
especially dividend payout, market to book ratio, real size, R&D are found to be 
significant and with expected signs. However, in the case of China, I report 
contradictory signs for those variables.  
 
The pecking order model suggests a negative relationship between leverage and cash 
holdings, In China and US sample, I found negative correlation between the two 
variables, and however, a positive sign of coefficient is found in UK data.  Thus, I 
accept the hypotheses H4 that there is a negative relationship between leverage and 
cash holdings in China and US, but I reject the hypothesis in the UK sample.  
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7.0 Regression analysis  
 
Table 6:Pannel regressions on cash holdings (whole sample)
6 % )
&.	
#
78 #
78 #
738 #
758 #
728
& 
 


#

0.28730  &0.00073  &0.00073  &0.00073  &0.00073  &0.00073  
 (0.52500) (0.21500) (0.21500) (0.21800) (0.21600) (0.21500) 
  &0.15162  &0.00783  &0.00775  &0.00776  &0.00774  &0.00741  
 (0.39700) (0.16200) (0.16600) (0.16500) (0.16600) 0.18500  
!" &0.16670** &0.12544*** &0.12532*** &0.12532*** &0.12653*** &0.12601*** 
 (0.01660) 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
#$ &0.83838** &0.00851*** &0.00912*** &0.00891** &0.00811* &0.01059** 
 (0.03200) 0.00000  0.00000  (0.03800) (0.06000) (0.01600) 
	%
 &2.64085  0.10510*** 0.10478*** 0.10488*** 0.10447*** 0.10541*** 
 (0.33900) 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
&'( 1.516155 0.10326** 0.10396** 0.10518** 0.10285** 0.09423** 
 (0.74700) 0.00500  (0.00500) (0.01300) (0.01500) (0.02600) 
#) &4.55985  0.00254  0.00244  0.00245  0.00257  0.00265  
 (0.50700) (0.72200) (0.73200) (0.73100) (0.71900) (0.71000) 
 0.2279943 0.01759*** 0.01851*** 0.01851*** 0.01818*** 0.01922*** 
 (0.32000) 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  
"'(   &0.15276  &0.15299  &0.13582  &0.13821  
   (0.11600) (0.11500) (0.16400) (0.15600) 

'('(    &0.00246  &0.00887 &0.01196  
    (0.95400) (0.83500) (0.78300) 
9'('(     0.04091** 0.04000** 
     (0.04100) (0.04600) 
:('(      0.02958** 
      (0.01100) 
"
 12 6286 6286 6286 6286 6286 
-;#1+<' 0.385 0.2637 0.2639 0.2638 0.2643 0.2653 

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7.1 Fama-MacBeth  

Table 6 presents the panel data regressions on cash holding levels in the 2000&2011 
periods, using the independent variables described earlier.  
 
In the first column of Table 6, I reports the estimates using the method presented in 
Fama & MacBeth (1973), this is known as the Fama & MacBeth model.  
 
With this approach, I estimated the cross&sectional regression on each sample year. 
The Fama and MacBeth model treats each sample year as an individual cross&section 
analyse, this allow us to eliminate the problem of serial correlation on a time&series 
cross&sectional estimation.  
 
I suggest that cash holdings decrease significantly with size. Cash holdings increase 
significantly with the leverage ratio. With the Fama &MacBeth regressions, the 
coefficients of the market&to&book, size, cash flow to assets, debt maturity variables 
are consistent with the static tradeoff theory.  
 
However, the coefficients of the dividend payout and R&D expenses variables appear 
insignificant; hence it does not support the trade off theory expectations.  
 
7.2 Regression 1 (Pooled-OLS) 
 
I present five additional regression estimates in Table 6. At the second column, I use a 
time&series cross&sectional regression on the whole sample year (regression 1), I 
found that dividend payout, and leverage, real size, cash flow and debt maturity are 
the main determinants of cash holdings.  
 
The coefficient of dividend payout (DPO) is 0.018, significant at 1% level. It suggests 
that for every 1% increase in DPO, cash holdings well increase by 0.018%. The result 
is not consistent with the tradeoff theory and H1.  
 
The leverage coefficient is negatively related to cash holdings; it is argued that firms 
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with better access to external funding hold less cash. On average, for every 1% 
increase in market to book ratio, it decrease cash holding by 0.0007%.  
 
Size and cash flow are significant at 1% confidence level, similar with my pervious 
Fama&MacBeth’s regression, a negative relationship was found between real size and 
cash holding, which implies for every unit increase in size would lead to 0.008% 
decline in cash holdings.   
 
Moreover, the coefficient of cash flow to asset 0.105, the result contradicted with the 
tradeoff theory expectation, as the theory suggests a negative correlation with cash 
holdings.  
 
7.3 Regression 2 (Firm-specific effect (dividend dummy)) 
 
Regression 2 shows the results for the dividend dummy, by adding a dummy variable 
into the regression; I are able to test whether dividend paying firm hold less cash than 
non&dividend paying firms. From my result, it can be see that the coefficient of 
dividend dummy is insignificant.  
 
Likewise, the coefficients sign and level of significance of the others variables Ire 
largely similar to regression 1. Hence, I conclude that the problem of the joint 
determination between dividend dummy and DPO does not affect out finding.  
 
7.4 Regression 3 (Country-specific effect (country dummy)) 
 
In order to incorporate legal and institutional characteristics into the analysis, I focus 
on pooled& regression analysis. In the forth columns,, I contain the proxies for country 
variable. A dummy that set the value equal to one for all Chinese firms, and zero for 
non&Chinese firms. With the additional country dummy, I am able to investigate 
whether the relationship between cash holdings changes with legal protection and 
ownership concentration.  
 
My findings suggest that firms in China have small level of cash holdings; on the 
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other hand firms in UK and US hold more cash.  
 
The differences between cash holdings on these countries can be explained by the 
ownership structure of a firm can also have an impact on their financial structure. In 
this case, firms in Asia like China are mostly family businesses and rely strongly on 
internal investment, and so the total cash holdings are loIr than countries with public 
companies such as US. My result is in line with hypothesis H10 and Al&Najjar (2012), 
which suggested that Chinese firms tend to hold less cash. 
 
7.5 Regression 4 (Industry effect (Industry dummy)) 
 
Table 6 presents OLS results for the pooled regression analysis where, in addition to 
industry dummy are combined to test the null hypothesis that cash holdings of firms 
do not significantly change across industry.  
 
Findings disclose a significant industry&specific effect on firm’s cash holding. The 
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and significant at 5% level, 
suggesting that chemicals and allied products firms hold more cash than non&
chemicals and allied products firms. On average, a chemicals and allied products firm 
has a higher cash holdings ratio than a non&chemicals and allied products firm by 
0.0491%, ceteris paribus.  

7.6 Regression 5 (Yearly dummy (post-crisis effect))  
 
Regression 5 reported the OLS result with additional of yearly dummies, the dummy 
is set to equal to one if the observation are from the post&crisis period (2008&2011). 
From my hypothesis, I propose a positive relationship between the crisis effects and 
cash holdings, H12.  
The final column shows that the coefficient of the yearly dummies is positive and 
significant at 5% level. Suggesting on average, firm hold 0.029% more cash after the 
financial crisis. This could explain by the financial distress cost arises after the 2008 
crisis, hence uunder the financial depression and market turndown, it was difficult for 
firms in to raise finance through banks. Firms tend to hold more cash as capital 
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market.  
 
My result supports my hypothesis H12 that there should be a positive relationship 
between yearly dummy (post&crisis period) and cash holdings.  
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8.0 Summary and Discussion  
 
Table 6 shows the R
2 
results
 
remain high in all regression and it means that my pooled 
cross&sectional estimations explain average around 24% of the variation in cash 
holdings.  
 
It is also reasonable to estimate the Variance inflating factor (VIF) for each 
regression. VIF is the measure of multicollinerity. The higher the VIF value, the 
higher the multicollinearity exists in the model. The multicollinearity problem would 
affect the regression as It might cause the R
2 
become artificially high and often 
contain wrong sign coefficient sign.  
 
I calculate the VIF by (1/(1&R
2
)), and compared the VIF results; it shows that the 
multicollinerity problem is low with average 1.35 VIF results.  I then conclude that all 
the regressions are free from the multicollinearity problem. 
 
The pooled regression results also indicate that firm’ cash holdings increase with cash 
flows to asset ratio, debt to maturity and dividend payout. And decrease with the size 
and the leverage ratio of firms. 
 
Similar result found in the five additional models. Variables leverage and size are 
again found to be significant in all regression. Discussions on each important finding 
are provided below: 
  
8.1 Size 

Firm’s size is an important determinant of cash holdings; the coefficients remain 
significant in all samples, which indicate the importance of size relative to the cash 
holdings.  The greater the firm size, the relaxed for firms to raise funds with lower 
cost and less restraints compared to small firms. It is recommended that larger firms 
depend less on cash holdings.   
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Similar with previous paper on cash holdings (M.A. Ferrera & A. S. Vilela 2004), my 
results indicate that the amount of cash held by firms is negatively affected by the 
size. The negative relationship established between cash holdings and size provides 
support to the trade&off argument and opposes the pecking order theory.  
 
8.2 Leverage 
 
Beside, a negative and significant correlation between leverage and cash holdings 
ratio is observed in all models. This can be explained by the tradeoff model, since 
there is high transaction cost exist on borrowing, and hence firms generally do not 
amend their leverage ratio frequently, instead, they would set their leverage level at a 
range optimal level. Regarding to the tradeoff theory, it suggest that there would be a 
tradeoff between transaction cost of taking on debt and cash holdings. Thus, this can 
explain the negative relationship between leverage ratio and cash holdings.   
 
8.3 Cash flows to asset 
 
Cash flow to asset ratio is a measure of earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes 
but before depreciation divided by book assets. I provide evidence of a significant 
positive relationship between cash flow to asset ratio and cash holdings. The positive 
impact between the two variables is predicted by the pecking order theory, which 
suggests that firms with high cash flow would have more cash.  
 
In other word, the negative association between cash flow and cash holdings is in 
conflict with the tradeoff theory. Hence, from the result, It is argued that cash flow 
cannot be seen as a cash substitute.  

8.4 Debt maturity 

I also provide evidence of a significant positive relationship between debt maturity 
and cash holdings.  It is suggests that firms with less debt repayable in one&year hold 
more cash. In other word, for every 1% decrease in debt maturity, it decreases the 
cash holdings by around 0.1%, ceteris paribus.  
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
8.5 Industry-specific effect 
 
In regression 4 & 5, dummy variables Ire created to represent for different industry 
and accounting period which takes into account of both the industry and the yearly 
effects. The hypothesis of the regression is to test whether industry of activity affect 
the firm’s cash holdings decision,. 
 
The results show that the cash holdings across different industries are varied. On 
average, a chemicals and allied products firm has a higher cash holdings ratio than a 
non&chemicals and allied products firm by 0.0491%, ceteris paribus.  
 
8.6 Year effect  

On the other hand, to investigate whether firms adjust their cash holdings decision 
during the financial distress period. Regression 5 shows the results for the yearly 
dummy coefficient. The coefficient of the yearly dummies is positive and significant 
at 5% level. Suggesting on average, firm hold 0.029% more cash during the crisis 
period than normal period. 
 
As I can see, some eevidence is reported for the industry&specific effect on cash 
holdings. This is in line with V. Subramaniam et. al (2011), as he found that firm 
operate in chemicals and allied products sectors hold the most cash among all 
industries. Hence, I confirmed the existence of industry&specific effect in the sample. 
 
The empirical results also suggest that firms hold more cash during crisis period than 
pre&crisis period, thus, it is confirmed that there is a positive correlation between 
financial distress and cash holdings 
 
Overall, I conclude that cash flows to asset, debt to maturity, dividend payout, size 
and the leverage ratio of firms are the main determinants of cash holding. Both the 
trade off theory and pecking order theories play an essential role to explain the 
determinants of firms’ cash holdings.  
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9.0 Robustness Test (Reduced-form Regressions) 
 
Table 7:Pannel regressions on cash holdings (Reduced form regressions)
6 % )
&.	
#
78 #
78 #
738 #
758
& 
 


#

0.506734 &0.002246 &0.0002813 &0.0002759 &0.0002613 
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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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 12 6286 6286 6286 6286 
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
In order to inspect the robustness of my results, a set of reduced form regressions are 
conducted and listed out in Table 7 with the determinants of dividend dummy, DPO 
and leverage to be omitted, as there is reason to believe that the joint correlation 
among leverage, cash holdings and investment policy would lead to inconsistent 
results.  
 
However, the results above reported are similar to those in Table 6, whereas the 
coefficient signs were unchanged for the remaining variables. Also, findings show the 
level of coefficient of real size, cash flow to asset and debt maturity remains 
significant at all samples.  
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As a result, I confirmed that the problem of the joint determination of leverage and 
cash holdings does not affect my findings, and I also conclude that size, cash flow and 
debt maturity are important financial determinants on cash holdings. 

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10.0 Conclusion  
 
In my dissertation I have investigated firms’ cash holdings decisions by using firm&
level data from US, UK and China with regard to different financial determinants and 
dummy variables, and the empirical results arising from my regression analysis may 
shed some lights as to why firms hold cash. All&in&all, cash holdings decisions of 
firms are mainly affected by leverage, firm size, cash flow to asset, debt maturity, 
country and industry&specific factors. 
 
No doubt different firms in different countries would hold different amount of cash 
and make different decisions of cash holdings, as expected and in accordance with 
previous studies such as that of Booth et al. (2001). However, from an international 
level, this study has an important implication since it shows that even if emerging 
markets such as that of China differ in various financial, legal and governmental 
contexts, yet they share the same financial determinants and firms in such countries 
follow almost similar patterns in managing their cash holdings when compared with 
their counterparts of firms in developed markets such as those in US and in UK. 
 
The cross sectional&time series model also shows that my selected financial features 
that affect cash holdings. In particular, leverage, firm size, cash flow to asset and debt 
maturity are found to be important financial determinants of cash holdings. 
 
This dissertation has two important results to be concluded, of which they extended 
my understanding over cash holdings behavior of firms.  
 
First, the relationship between leverage and cash holdings has been detailed discussed 
and analyzed, especially that of the borrowing decisions of firms exerts an impact on 
their cash holdings decisions. I would argue that leverage acts as a substitute for cash 
holdings but at the same time increases the probability of financial distress. Hence a 
significantly negative relationship can be observed in all regression models.  
 
The result therefore indicates that firms with stronger earnings, riskier activities, and 
smaller size would hold more cash than other firms, and firms that have greater access 
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to the capital market and higher debt maturity tend to hold less cash.  
 
Secondly, the corporate governance issues such as those of the legal and institutional 
characteristics are important to firms’ cash holdings decisions. By inspecting the 
country dummies, it is argued that countries with stronger creditor protection such as 
that of China would increase the probability of bankruptcy upon financially distressed 
situations, which would in turn imply more accumulation of cash.  
 
Country and industry&specific features as well as firm&specific features play a 
important starring role in defining cash holdings decision of firms. My results also 
suggest that the amount of industry effect can stimulus cash policies of firms.  
 
My analysis also provides that positive cash holdings leads firms to spend more on 
investment, dividend payment or R&D expenses are of limited support. 

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